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Net neutrality is no longer only a battle cry of a few Internet romancers but has evolved 
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that net neutrality is about to emerge as a new fundamental value and right. Its 
constitutionalisation is happening bottom-up, driven by social movements, Internet 
activists and advocacy groups, and further, in an interweavement of civil society 
dynamics with the legal system. The question is whether constitutional structures have 
already become identifiable. The last section discusses the relationship between social 
and formal constitutional structures from a legitimacy and democracy perspective.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
On 26 February 2015 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted 
new rules on net neutrality, requiring providers of fixed and wireless Internet access 
to respect the principle of Internet openness and to abstain from blocking, throttling 
or paid prioritisation practices. 1  Considering the long history of unsuccessful 
campaigning for net neutrality in the United States, this was quite a spectacular 
result.2  Originally, network neutrality was coined by Timothy Wu in 2003 as a 
political term identifying the maintenance of the openness and freedom of the 
Internet architecture as a public policy goal.3 In 2008, the FCC made its first attempt 
to turn network neutrality into a legal concept when deciding that Comcast was not 
allowed to one-sidedly throttle content that originated from peer-to-peer platforms. 
Two years later the FCC’s decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia (DC) Circuit, based on the argument that the FCC’s regulation 
lacked the necessary legal basis.4 In reaction to that decision, the FCC back-pedaled 
and announced new rules on 21 December 2010, allowing Internet service providers 
(ISPs) to engage in traffic management policies provided they were transparent and 
did not involve ‘unreasonable discrimination’. 5  Although these rules were only 
‘better-than-nothing’ and frustrated expectations of comprehensive net neutrality 
prohibiting any discrimination between data packages,6 they were again struck down 
by the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit in Verizon v FCC on 14 January 2014.7 
Again, the lack of a sufficient legal foundation for the FCC regulation was the main 
reason for the court’s verdict.8 Considering this second defeat of the Commission for 
its open Internet regulatory politics, it was quite surprising that only one year later 
the FCC had adopted an order paving the way for the fully-fledged 
institutionalisation of net neutrality grounded on a solid basis in US law. How has 
this been possible? 
The thesis to be presented and defended in this paper is that the FCC has been 
able to do this because the call for net neutrality is no longer only a battle cry of a few 
                                                        
1  See Federal Communications Commission, ‘Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, FCC Report and 
Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order’, GN Docket No 14–28, FCC 15–24, adopted 26 February 
2015, 7–8. 
2  On the origins and history of the net neutrality debate in the US see Jeffrey A Hart, ‘The Net Neutrality 
Debate in the United States’ (2011) 8(4) Journal of Information Technology & Politics 418. 
3  Timothy Wu, ‘Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination’ (2003) 2 Journal on Telecommunications and 
High Technology Law 141. 
4  Comcast v FCC (6 Apri1 2010) USCA 08–1291 (DC Circuit).   
5  Federal Communications Commission, ‘Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd 17905 and FCC Report 
and Order’, GN Docket No 09–191,WC Docket No 07–52, FCC 10–201, adopted 21 December 2010. 
6  Harold Feld, ‘Quick Guide Upcoming Net Neutrality Rules Challenge’, Public Knowledge (23 September 
2011), online: <www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/quick-guide-upcoming-net-neutrality-rules-
cha>. 
7 Verizon v FCC (14 January 2014) USCA 11–1355 (DC Circuit). 
8  Adi Robertson, ‘Federal Court Strikes Down FCC Net Neutrality Rules’, The Verge (14 January 2014), online: 
<www.theverge.com/2014/1/14/5307650/federal-court-strikes-down-net-neutrality-rules>. 
 CHRISTOPH BEAT GRABER                                                                                                                                                                                       5 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Internet romancers but has evolved into a key value for contemporary society, a 
value that is being institutionalised as a constitutional right. The paper’s theoretical 
foundation is sociological systems theory as developed by Niklas Luhmann and 
others. On these grounds it will argue that the social institutionalisation of 
constitutional rights is to be distinguished from their legal institutionalisation. 
Commonly, constitutional rights emerge from society before they are reformulated in 
the legal realm. The paper intends to prove empirically that net neutrality is about to 
emerge as a new fundamental value and it does so because of its supreme 
importance for the protection of free and open communication processes on the 
Internet. Although this is a global development, the paper’s empiric focus is 
primarily on the United States. The constitutionalisation of net neutrality is 
happening bottom-up, driven by social movements, Internet activists and advocacy 
groups, and, in a second step, an interweavement of such civil society dynamics with 
the legal system. A further question to be addressed will be: have we already reached 
the point where constitutional structures become identifiable? In the last section the 
paper discusses the relationship between social and formal constitutional structures 
from a legitimacy and democracy perspective.  
2. LEGAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORISING 
2.1 WHAT IS A CONSTITUTION?  
The key question that needs to be addressed in this paper as a preliminary is: 
what is a ‘constitution’ and how should we conceive this concept in the digital 
networked environment? 
In the context of public law doctrine and also in everyday language, the word 
‘constitution’ is commonly used to refer to a written text containing a set of rules and 
principles that are of fundamental importance for a nation state. There is general 
agreement that the term constitution originally related to the nation state.9 According 
to Harold Berman, the term ‘constitutionalism’ was invented around the threshold of 
the nineteenth century ‘to refer chiefly to the American doctrine of supremacy of the 
written constitution over enacted laws’.10 Processes of generalised legal formalisation 
already existed in the high medieval European society. However, as pointed out by 
Chris Thornhill, this ‘involved little more than the establishment of formally drafted 
summaries of existing common laws or customs’.11 The subsequent period of early 
modernity witnessed an increasing (albeit heterogeneous) positivisation of the law 
and a simultaneous expansion of political abstraction.12 However, constitutions as 
                                                        
9  Dieter Grimm, ‘Constitution beyond the Nation State?’ (2011) Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 181, 181. 
10  Harold J Berman, Law and Revolution (Harvard University Press, 1983) 396. 
11  Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 57–58. 
12  This evolution was boosted by the Reformation in evangelical societies but evolved differently in most 
post-Reformation territories. A level of statehood that is comparable to modern legal and political 
autonomy had not been achieved in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. (See Thornhill (n 11) 96–103, 
158–9). 
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formalised texts were only adopted at the end of the eighteenth century.13 Formalised 
constitutions emerged at that time in the United States and in France as a 
consequence of revolutions against a monarchic dominion that had claimed to be 
independent of the law. To clearly distance the revolutionary project from the old 
regime, a written document of law was required that regulated the establishment and 
exercising of state power.14 Consequently, a constitution in the formal sense can be 
defined as a supreme text of political and legal nature that constitutes and limits the 
power of the state.15  
Mostly as a consequence of the establishment of an international legal order and 
fuelled by the effects of globalisation, we have been experiencing a growing interest 
in the legal literature surrounding the question of whether the concept of the 
constitution could also have a meaning beyond the borders of the nation state.16 This 
question is of particular importance for the topic of this paper since the Internet is a 
global medium, and studying the relationship between net neutrality and 
constitutionalism thus requires a global perspective. 
With regard to the debate on how it would be possible to conceptualise 
constitutionalism beyond national territorial borders, one can distinguish between 
two main schools of thought.  First, there is classical legal literature surrounding the 
question of a possible ‘constitutionalisation of international law’.17 According to these 
views, international law in the aftermath of the Second World War is perceived as a 
stratified system of different interrelated and mutually supportive legal orders with a 
constitution at its top which is represented by the Charter of the United Nations.18 A 
similar discussion takes place at the mega-regional level, related to the economic and 
political integration of the European Union (EU) and the crucial role that the Court of 
Justice of the EU (CJEU) has been performing in this process of 
                                                        
13  Thornhill considers the fact that ‘laws were increasingly written in textual form’ to be an important 
parameter in a general development towards political abstraction and legal generalisation. (Thornhill (n 11) 
74). 
14  Grimm (n 9) 181. 
15  Thornhill (n 11) 8–11. 
16  For sceptical views see Grimm (n 9); Dieter Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its 
Prospects in a Changed World’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? 
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 3–22; Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalism?’ in Petra Dobner and 
Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010) 47–72; Martin 
Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form 
(Oxford University Press, 2007). 
17  Oliver Diggelmann and Tilmann Altwicker, ‘Is There Something Like a Constitution of International Law?: 
A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitutionalism’ (2008) 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 623; Anne Peters, ‘Are we Moving towards Constitutionalization of the 
World Community?’ in Antonio Cassese (ed) Realizing Utopia. The Future of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 118–35. For an overview of the literature see Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir 
Ulfstein, The Constitutionalisation of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009); and Thomas Kleinlein 
and Anne Peters, ‘International Constitutional Law’ in Anthony Carty (ed), Oxford Bibliographies in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
18  See Bardo Fassbender, The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International Community (Nijhoff, 
2009); Bardo Fassbender, ‘“We the Peoples of the United Nations”: Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form in International Law’ in Neil Walker and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism. 
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford University Press, 2007) 269–90; Erika De Wet, ‘The 
International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 51. 
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‘constitutionalisation’. 19  A key question here is the relationship between the 
primarily economic freedoms enshrined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
(TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the rights guaranteed 
in the national constitutions of EU member states as well as in the standard-setting 
human rights instruments at the European and global level. 20  This literature, 
however, remains caught in narrow frames of public law and political philosophy, 
tending to extrapolate constitutional thinking from the nation state to the global or 
regional level.21 
Second, there is literature addressing the topic of constitutionalism from a 
sociological perspective, while keeping its focus on politics and the state. Whereas the 
first (essentially legal) type of constitutional theorising is, as mentioned above, 
mostly interested in the form of the constitution, this sociological approach uses the 
term constitution to relate to its necessary functions in constituting and balancing the 
political system and the legal system. Hence, the formal-normative perspective on 
the constitution that is common ground in the legal literature is juxtaposed by a 
functional-empirical one. Niklas Luhmann has contributed pioneering work 
analysing the evolution of nation states’ formal constitutions from a functional 
perspective of sociological systems theory as the close structural coupling of the legal 
and political systems.22 Accordingly, the constitution of a nation state has a double 
existence, as both a supreme text of legal authority and as the political foundation of 
a society.  
A functional perspective suggests distinguishing constitutive and limitative 
structures or functions in the existing formal constitutions. The constitutive and 
limitative functions have evolved over a long historical process and they first became 
visible at the end of the Middle Ages with the development of a degree of political or 
legal autonomy and, as a pendency of emerging statehood, the restriction of personal 
and sectoral privileges.23 In a modern formal constitution, the constitutive function is 
generally anchored in its chapters regulating the organisation and government of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers. The limitative function can be identified in 
those parts of a formal constitution where the fundamental rights of citizens are 
guaranteed. It can also be found in the system of checks and balances that orders the 
mutual relationship between the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers 
and, in federal states such as Switzerland, the relationship between the federal and 
the sub-federal levels of government. 
                                                        
19  Joseph HH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?’ and other Essays on 
European Integration (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
20  See Dierk Schindler, Die Kollision von Grundfreiheiten und Gemeinschaftsgrundrechten: Entwurf eines 
Kollisionsmodells unter Zusammenführung der Schutzpflichten- und Drittwirkungslehre (Duncker-Humblot, 
2001). 
21  See the discussion in Gunther Teubner, ‘The Project of Constitutional Sociology: Irritating Nation State 
Constitutionalism’ (2013) 4 Transnational Legal Theory 44, 52. Theoretically, these writings are often directly 
or indirectly influenced by Hans Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’. (Pure Theory of Law, translation from the 
second revised and enlarged German edition by M Knight, (University of California Press, 1970) ch 7). See 
eg Chris Thornhill, ‘The Mutation of International Law in Contemporary Constitutions: Thinking 
Sociologically about Political Constitutionalism’ (2016) 79(2) The Modern Law Review 207, 208–9. 
22  Niklas Luhmann, ‘Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft’ (1990) 9 Rechtshistorisches Journal 176; 
Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 2000) 391–2. 
23  Thornhill (n 11) 80. 
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Luhmann’s writings have greatly influenced later work on sociological 
constitutionalism focusing on the question of whether functional equivalents of the 
constitutive and limitative functions of a nation state constitution could be identified 
in or extended to the international legal and political order.24  
2.2 FOR A TRANSNATIONAL CONCEPT OF CONSTITUTION 
As the impact of net neutrality exceeds the territorial boundaries of nation states 
and considering the fact that a few private actors have become extremely powerful on 
the Internet, Niklas Luhmann’s view of today’s society as a world society25 is of the 
greatest interest to the study of constitutionalism on the Internet. For Luhmann, 
world society stands for a world of globalised functional societal differentiation. 
Accordingly, the emergence of constitutional functions cannot be analysed in the 
national realm only, but the perspective must be extended to a global horizon. The 
principle of functional societal differentiation is commonly understood as the 
embodiment of modernity. 26  Luhmann’s thesis that the transition to functional 
differentiation ‘can culminate only in the establishment of a world societal system’ 27 
prompted one strand of constitutional sociology to acknowledge that constitutions 
may evolve in transnational political processes outside the nation state.28 
In the world society, most function systems of society spread globally, including 
the economy, science, art, education, health, mass media and family (to list the 
systems Luhmann mentions most frequently). Regarding the systems of law and 
politics, the situation is more complicated. While territorial differentiation continues 
to be important for the law,29 the reach of the legal system has expanded to also 
include elements of international, transnational and global law. By contrast, the 
political system remains strongly centred in the nation state. For Luhmann ‘[t]he 
result is that the structural coupling of the political system and the legal system 
through constitutions does not have an equivalent at the level of global society’.30 As 
a consequence, the asymmetry between politics and law at the global level reflects a 
decline of constitutionalism. 
Analysing the question from a different perspective, a new thrust of sociological 
constitutional thinking has emerged that is mainly known as civil or societal 
constitutionalism. This is a strand of constitutional sociology that studies the 
emergence of constitutions outside international politics in the global society’s 
                                                        
24  For a recent account see Thornhill (n 21). 
25  Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, vol I, translated by Rhodes Barret (Stanford University Press, 2012) 83–
99; Niklas Luhmann, Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 2000) 220. 
26  The scholars most influential in conceptualising theories of societal differentiation have been Emile 
Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons, Pierre Bourdieu and Niklas Luhmann. 
27  Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, vol II, translated by Rhodes Barret (Stanford University Press, 2013) 129. 
28  Teubner (n 21) 45. 
29  The reason for the law to remain partly differentiated territorially is that the court system (a sub-system of 
the law) is organised at the national level. See Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, vol I, (n 25) 96. 
30  Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, translated by Klaus Alex Ziegert (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
487–8. See also Gunther Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Gunther 
Teubner (ed), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, 1997) 3–28, 6. 
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‘private’ sectors.31 A leading scholar of societal constitutionalism is David Sciulli, 
who laid the foundations for his theory more than twenty years ago.32 For Sciulli, 
voluntary procedural restraints in the economy or other spheres of society question 
the presupposition of a demise of constitutionalism. Following up on Sciulli’s thesis, 
Gunther Teubner’s approach to societal constitutionalism is to reconstruct the central 
functions of a constitution in a world society that has been shifting from territorial 
differentiation to functional differentiation. 33  Teubner observes the evolution of 
constitutional norms in a variety of transnational contexts 34  while showing a 
particular interest in the analysis of constitutional processes in the digital 
environment 35  and in the economic sphere. 36  One of the main questions in his 
research relates to the role and constitutional status of transnational corporations 
(TNCs), as some of them have become so powerful that they challenge the 
governance of nation states in a number of respects. 37  TNCs have constituted 
themselves as new actors of the world economy in order to release themselves from 
the influence of national legal orders. They benefit from the strong competition 
between states to attract powerful corporations as providers of jobs and as tax payers. 
TNCs are thus free to establish themselves in the state that offers the most favourable 
legal conditions for business and—in cases of political change or other reasons—to 
move their domicile from one country to another.  
For Teubner, TNCs operate in the organised professional sphere of the economic 
system. At a micro-level he argues that TNCs develop their own constitutions, 
distinguishing internally between constitutive and limitative functions. While the 
constitutive functions in TNC constitutions are strongly institutionalised, the 
limitative functions are underdeveloped. Teubner’s question—which is also of 
importance in the realm of this paper—is how TNCs can be ‘pushed’ to develop 
limitative functions in their constitutions.38 For Teubner, such pressure can only arise 
from segments of civil society, such as labour unions, consumer protection 
organisations, activist movements etc.39 
                                                        
31  Teubner (n 21) 45. 
32  David Sciulli, Theory of Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992); see also David Sciulli, Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal 
Constitutionalism (New York University Press, 2001). 
33  Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’ in 
Christian Joerges et al (eds), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart, 2004) 3–28; Gunther 
Teubner, Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization, translated by Gareth Norbury 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). For a critical appraisal see Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘The Evolution of the Law 
and the Possibility of a “Global Law” Extending Beyond the Sphere of the State—Simultaneously, a 
Critique of the “Self Constitutionalisation” Thesis’ (2012) Ancilla Iuris 220. 
34  Teubner (n 21) 46–51. 
35  Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism’ (n 33). 
36  Gunther Teubner, ‘Transnational Economic Constitutionalism in the Varieties of Capitalism’ (2015) 01-02 
The Italian Law Journal 219. 
37  Gunther Teubner, ‘Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of "Private" and "Public" Corporate 
Codes of Conduct’ (2011) 18(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 17; see also Chris Thornhill, A Sociology 
of Transnational Constitutions: The Social Foundations of the Post-National Legal Structure (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), chapter 7. 
38  Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 33) 75–88. 
39  Ibid. 
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Societal constitutionalism therefore is highly relevant for this paper, particularly 
the perspective of Teubner. In cyberspace we are in the presence of powerful TNCs 
including Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon (‘the GAFA’) or big Internet access 
providers such as Comcast that—sometimes in cooperation with public actors—are 
creating hybrid worlds of governance that deeply impact the rights and freedoms of 
citizens. This development raises important questions including: 1) How can 
constitutional or human rights disciplines be extended to such players, which—as 
private actors—are not subjects of international law and are not bound by nation 
state constitutional law; 2) Is it possible to tame the power of big Internet companies 
by means of constitutional rights? These questions go beyond the scope of this paper 
and are the subject of an ongoing research project of the author. 
3. THE EMERGENCE OF NET NEUTRALITY AS A NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE 
3.1 SOCIAL CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERATION 
Different legal orders have developed different answers to the question of how 
the reality of social change should be associated with the idea of constitutional 
stability. Most Western jurisdictions provide for specific rules regulating how the 
formal constitution of a nation state can be altered. According to HLA Hart, in the 
course of modernisation legal systems have developed secondary rules to 
supplement primary rules of obligation that alone cannot cope with enhanced 
societal complexity.40 Among the secondary rules distinguished by Hart, a rule of 
change will serve to remedy the static quality from which the normative order of a 
society would suffer if consisting only of primary rules of obligation.41 Rules of 
change can refer to the alteration of both ordinary legislation and the formal 
constitution.42 Generally, an alteration to a formal constitution will need to meet 
procedural requirements that are stricter than those governing the alteration of 
ordinary legislation.43 Whereas certain jurisdictions do not distinguish between types 
                                                        
40  HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, 1961) 89. 
41  According to Hart, a normative order with a static quality does not possess the means ‘of deliberately 
adapting the rules to changing circumstances, either by eliminating old rules or introducing new ones’. 
(Hart (n 40) 90). 
42  The alteration of the formal constitution needs to be distinguished from its ‘evolutive’ or ‘dynamic’ 
interpretation through the judiciary. Such practices will most often unfold within a ‘grey zone’ that is not 
explicitly regulated in the formal constitutional text and is likely to cause controversial reactions including 
allegations of ‘judicial activism’. On evolutive interpretation of the US constitution from a comparative 
perspective see Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Conor O'Mahony, ‘Evolutive Interpretation of Rights 
Provisions: A Comparison of the European Court of Human Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court’ (2013) 
44(2) Columbia Human Rights Law Review 309. 
43  The Constitution of the United States provides for the possibility of constitutional amendment in Article V. 
The amendment process is divided into two stages, a proposal of amendment and its subsequent 
ratification. Both steps require a supermajority consensus. These relatively strict requirements for 
constitutional alteration may explain why the US Constitution has only rarely been amended since it was 
adopted. (Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 3rd edn 2000) 94–5). 
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of constitutional rules, 44  other jurisdictions do not allow for the alteration of 
guarantees of democratic government or the rule of law.  
In Switzerland, the Federal Court has been adding unwritten fundamental rights 
to the texture of the formal constitution since 1959.45 In its case law related to the 
Swiss Federal Constitution of 1874, the Swiss Federal Court has recognised a number 
of legally binding and enforceable fundamental rights, notwithstanding the absence 
of a direct point of reference in the formal constitutional document.46 Among these 
fundamental rights are the right to own property, the freedom of expression, the 
right to personal freedom, the freedom of assembly, the freedom to use any language 
and the right to assistance and care. On the occasion of the total revision of the Swiss 
Constitution in 1999, these rights were all formally included in the revised 
constitutional document. The possibility for the Swiss Federal Court to recognise 
unwritten fundamental rights when necessary also continues to exist under the new 
Constitution of 1999.47 
From a sociological perspective the practice of recognising unwritten 
fundamental rights by court decision can be explained as a legal institutionalisation 
of an important value that has so far only been socially institutionalised. According to 
Niklas Luhmann, this reflects that fundamental rights are first and foremost social 
institutions.48 Thus, fundamental rights as we find them in formalised nation state 
constitutions are reformulations of fundamental social values in the ‘language’ of the 
legal system. With the recognition of an unwritten fundamental right the judiciary 
can decide to supplement the existing catalogue of fundamental rights, as a response 
to perceived changes in the social or technological reality.  
In Switzerland, it was Zaccaria Giacometti, in 1955, who theoretically paved the 
way for recognition of unwritten fundamental rights by the Swiss Federal Court.49 
Giacometti was of the view that it is the essence and axiomatic principle of 
fundamental rights to provide for a comprehensive guarantee of individual freedom 
and human dignity in the context of the state. 50  He emphasised that his 
understanding of fundamental rights was positivistic and not metaphysical or 
political. 51  The catalogue of fundamental rights existing in a formal written 
constitution can only include those articulations of human freedom that were known 
to be endangered at the time when the historic constitution-maker was at work. Since 
time passes and social conditions change, ‘every new aspect of individual freedom 
that receives clear form as a consequence of new interferences with human dignity or 
                                                        
44  See Articles 192–5 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999. 
45  See René A Rhinow and Markus Schefer, Schweizerisches Verfassungsrecht (Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2nd edn 
2009) 201. 
46  Ibid, 5. 
47  Ibid, 201. 
48  Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution: Ein Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie (Duncker & Humblot, 
1965) 13. 
49  Zaccaria Giacometti, ‘Die Freiheitsrechtskataloge als Kodifikation der Freiheit: Festrede des Rektors 
Zaccaria Giacometti, gehalten an der 122. Stiftungsfeier der Universität Zürich am 29. April 1955’, in 
Jahresbericht der Universität Zürich 1954/1955,  3–24. 
50  Ibid, 18. 
51  Ibid, 8. 
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individual personality must also be guaranteed by the catalogue of human rights’.52 
Since the possibility of state intrusions on individual freedom seems factually 
unlimited, consequently the enumeration of fundamental rights in a formal 
constitutional document also cannot be exhaustive. In support of his theory 
Giacometti also mentioned the Ninth Amendment of the US Constitution, stating 
that ‘the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people’.53 
Constitutional alteration by the judiciary is not unproblematic since it interferes 
with the separation and division of powers that is itself one of the cornerstones of the 
rule of law. The Swiss Federal Court is aware of the problem since historically it has 
recognised new fundamental rights only in situations of pressing social need and 
provided that certain formal requirements are met. For example, when the Court 
recognised the freedom of expression in 1965, it considered—under the influence of 
Giacometti—that this freedom was a necessary precondition for the freedom of the 
press, which was explicitly provided by the written constitution.54 In addition, the 
Swiss Federal Court considered that, at the time, freedom of expression was 
explicitly guaranteed by several constitutions of Swiss Cantons. 
3.2 NORMATIVE CONTOURS OF A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
Is net neutrality a fundamental social value that, although not contained in 
formalised constitutional documents, should be legally recognised as a binding and 
enforceable constitutional guarantee? This is a normative question. It would 
probably not make much sense to answer it in the abstract and without taking 
account of particular national rules regulating procedures of constitutional alteration. 
Methodologically, an exemplary approach may thus be sensible, exploring the 
problem in light of the criteria for the recognition of unwritten fundamental rights 
discussed above as developed by the Swiss Federal Court. According to this practice, 
an important social change would first be required as a precondition. 
This important social change has been the rise of new technologies which has 
enabled the digital networked environment to become the primary platform of 
communication in developed societies. According to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), today the Internet is one of the principal means for individuals to 
exercise their freedom of expression and information as guaranteed under Article 10 
ECHR, and it is there that ‘one finds essential tools for the participation in activities 
and debates related to questions of politics or public interest’.55 According to settled 
case law of the ECtHR, Article 10 ECHR covers not only the content of information 
but also the means of dissemination of such information.56 In Cengiz v Turkey, the 
ECtHR found in 2015 that the imposition of a blanket blocking order on access to 
                                                        
52  Ibid, 17 (translation by the author). 
53  Ibid, 21. 
54  Swiss Federal Court Decision BGE 91 I 480, at p 485; see Peter Saladin, Grundrechte im Wandel (Stämpfli, 3rd 
edn 1982) 75 and Jörg Paul Müller, Die Grundrechte der schweizerischen Bundesverfassung. Grundrechte 
besonderer Teil (Stämpfli, 2nd edn 1991) 89. 
55  Ahmet Yıldırım v Turkey (application no 3111/10, ECtHR 2012), para 54. 
56  Ibid, para 50, with reference to Autronic AG v Switzerland, 22 May 1990, series A no 178, para 47. 
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YouTube by the Turkish authorities violated the rights of the applicants under 
Article 10 ECHR. Although the applicants were not directly targeted by the measure, 
the blocking order had affected their right under Article 10 ECHR since YouTube 
was an important means for them to exercise their right to receive and impart 
information or ideas.57 For similar reasons the ECtHR had already decided in Ahmet 
Yıldırım v Turkey that the general blocking of the Google search engine violated 
Article 10 ECHR.58 In both cases the applicable Turkish Law no 5651 did not allow 
the judicial authorities to impose a blanket blocking order on access to the mentioned 
websites. In Cengiz v Turkey, Law no 5651 was amended during pending proceedings 
and now allows, under certain conditions, blocking orders to be imposed on an entire 
website. Since the case had to be adjudicated on the facts given when the application 
was filed, the Court did not decide whether such a broad blocking order would be in 
conformity with Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR noted however, obiter, that any 
blocking order must respect strict requirements regarding its delimitation, and 
efficient mechanisms of judicial review must be provided.59 
As the prohibition on blocking Internet access is one of the central postulates of 
net neutrality,60 it is fair to say that the ECtHR in Cengiz v Turkey and Ahmet Yıldırım v 
Turkey has—at least marginally—touched aspects of this principle in the realm of an 
interpretation of Article 10 ECHR. Beyond the mentioned case law of the ECtHR, 
Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers 
on net neutrality61  may provide guidance for future interpretation of Article 10 
ECHR in cases involving the management of data flows on the Internet.62 The main 
target of Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 is interferences with Internet traffic that 
‘result in blocking, discrimination or prioritisation of specific types of content, 
applications or services’. 63  For the Committee, such practices raise concerns 
regarding Article 10 ECHR as well as the right to private life and the protection of 
personal data as covered by Article 8 ECHR and the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No 108).64 
The Recommendation rightly emphasises that the link between freedom of 
expression and the protection of private life and personal data is crucial in any 
discussion about how the normative contours of net neutrality are to be defined. 
Evidently, individuals need a private sphere to be protected in their communication 
                                                        
57  Cengiz and Others v Turkey (applications nos 48226/10 and 14027/11, ECtHR 2015).  
58  Yıldırım v Turkey (n 55). 
59  Cengiz v Turkey (n 57) paras 62 and 74. 
60  Barbara van Schewick, Internet Architecture and Innovation (MIT Press, 2010) 220. 
61  Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on protecting and 
promoting the right to freedom of expression and the right to private life with regard to network neutrality, 
adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 13 January 2016, at the 1244th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies. 
62  As a matter of fact the ECtHR often refers to Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers when 
interpreting the ECHR. 
63  Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)1, (n 61) para 2. 
64  Ibid, para 3. 
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as this is a precondition for autonomous opinion-building and subsequently 
participation in any discursive process.65  
The above-cited case law of the ECtHR and the Recommendation of the 
Committee of Ministers provide evidence that net neutrality is conceived broadly by 
the Strasbourg authorities as an important social value interrelating with several 
Convention rights, including freedom of expression and information, the right to 
private life, and the protection of personal data. What we have before us, so far, are 
mainly a number of crystallisation points of an emerging norm, but we are still far 
away from being able to identify tangible contours of a new right protecting the open 
Internet. One of the questions that remains unanswered is what the scope of 
protection of such a right would be. In my view the new right should not only 
protect individuals in their communication online but, beyond that, should also 
protect the objective preconditions of individual communication. Hence, we would 
need a right that would also protect the Internet as an institution.  
If we widen the focus of our search for normative evidence indicating an 
institutional protection of the Internet, we find interesting case law of the German 
Constitutional Court. In a 2008 landmark decision, the German Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that people using the Internet as a means for communication should 
be protected in their expectations of the integrity of the technology they are using.66 
The case dealt with remote computer searches by government authorities, and as a 
result, the Court adopted an unwritten basic right of the German Constitution 
(Grundgesetz) ‘to the guarantee of the confidentiality and integrity of information 
technology systems’.67 The Court held that the government was not allowed to use 
spy or surveillance software to infiltrate information technology systems because of 
the newly adopted right of the Grundgesetz, unless there were exceptional 
circumstances. Infiltration is to be understood as secret intrusion into an information 
system that makes it possible to monitor the use of the target system, view stored 
media and control the target system remotely, ie spying on a system as a whole.68 
The ‘integrity’ of the system is threatened by the ability of the infiltrators to delete, 
alter or create new data.69 What ‘information technology system’ means exactly was 
not defined by the Court. However, it stated that the Internet ‘consists of information 
technology systems, and can itself also be regarded as an information technology 
system’.70 In other words, the Court established a right to ‘network integrity’ as far as 
necessary for the newly adopted right. The Court also made it clear that it had to be a 
system the access to which would allow one to obtain detailed insight into the 
                                                        
65  UN Human Rights Council (HRC), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue’, 17th Session (UN Doc A/HRC/17/27, 
2011), para 53; Council of the European Union, ‘EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression 
Online and Offline’, Foreign Affairs Council Meeting (12 May 2014), 18. See also Julie E Cohen, Configuring 
the Networked Self: Law, Code and the Play of Everyday Practice (Yale University Press, 2012) 110–15. 
66  BVerfG, 1 BvR 370/07, 27 February 2008; an English translation is available online: 
<www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20080227_1bvr037007en.html>. 
67  Ibid, paras 100 and 135. 
68  Ibid, paras 5 and 122. 
69  Ibid, para 174. 
70  Ibid, para 4. 
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personality of the person concerned.71 Although the new right was developed out of 
the right of personality (Art 2.1 in conjunction with Art 1.1 of the Grundgesetz), it has 
been argued in the academic literature that the relevance of the integrity of 
information technology systems goes beyond the protection of individual 
autonomies, 72  reaching out to institutional (objective) aspects of communicative 
freedom online. The German Constitutional Court’s ruling was revolutionary, but it 
is limited in scope due to being restricted to state actions.73 There is, though, an 
obvious similarity between the measures or software that the Court was trying to 
protect against and the technologies that private companies use to monitor Internet 
users’ online behaviour. As we know, some of these private actors are more powerful 
than many states. 
Secret surveillance of Internet communication is likely to produce chilling effects 
on free speech, as empirical research has demonstrated.74 Hence, the expectation of 
an undisturbed and non-manipulated functioning of the technological medium is 
required for the enjoyment of individual and social communicative autonomy on the 
Internet. Interference with the Internet’s functionality that is not transparent would 
be particularly harmful in this respect. Since confidence in the integrity of Internet 
communication is a precondition for communicative freedom, the normative purpose 
of a new fundamental right of the Internet should include, inter alia, a guarantee for 
everyone to a process of communication that is free from any kind of manipulation of 
its technical functionality.75  Such protection should be effective not only against 
governments but also against private actors. 
4. THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF NET NEUTRALITY 
4.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES 
Timothy Wu introduced network neutrality in a 2003 paper as a novel ‘non-
discrimination principle’ providing that ‘absent evidence of harm to the local 
network or the interests of other users, broadband carriers should not discriminate in 
how they treat traffic on their broadband network on the basis of inter-network 
                                                        
71  Ibid, para 137. 
72  Vagias Karavas, ‘Das Computer-Grundrecht: Persönlichkeitsschutz unter informationstechnischen 
Bedingungen’ (2010) 7(2) WestEnd: neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 95. 
73  The fact that fundamental rights apply only in relations between an individual and the state is still a 
general problem of fundamental rights doctrine. The ECtHR, for example, generally requires interference 
by a public authority in the exercising of the rights guaranteed by the ECHR as a precondition for a 
decision on the merits of a case. See eg Cengiz v Turkey (n 57) para 57. For a comparative discussion of this 
problem in a cyberspace context see Christoph B Graber, ‘Internet Creativity, Communicative Freedom 
and a Constitutional Rights Theory Response to “Code is Law”’in Sean Pager and Adam Candeup (eds), 
Transnational Culture in the Internet Age (Edward Elgar, 2012) 135–64, 153–7. 
74  Jonathan W Penney, ‘Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use’ (2016) 31(1) Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal 1. 
75  See Vagias Karavas, Digitale Grundrechte: Elemente einer Verfassung des Informationsflusses im Internet (Nomos, 
2007) 196. 
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criteria’.76 What Wu had in mind was a principle that would be able to strike a 
balance between the ‘inter network’, where broadband operators must abstain from 
restrictions, and the local network, where they should be allowed ‘to police what 
they own’.77 Despite its admitted ‘vagueness’78 and lack of a legal foundation, the 
principle took off meteorically and it rapidly became a key benchmark in political 
debates about the future of the Internet’s architecture. The FCC referred to the 
principle’s guiding theme for the first time79 in a 2005 Statement on Internet policy,80 
determining that ‘the Commission has jurisdiction necessary to ensure that providers 
of telecommunications for Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) 
services are operated in a neutral manner’.81 The policy statement provided for a 
number of network neutrality principles concerning the encouragement of 
‘broadband deployment’ and the preservation and promotion of the ‘open and 
interconnected nature of the public Internet’. Based on these principles, the FCC, in a 
2008 order, prohibited Comcast from throttling Bittorrent traffic when providing 
broadband Internet access over its cable lines.82 This was the FCC’s first attempt to 
turn network neutrality into a legal concept. It was not successful as the Court of 
Appeals for the DC Circuit reversed the FCC order on 6 April 2010, determining that 
there was no legal basis in the Communications Act that would authorise the FCC to 
regulate Comcast’s network management practices.83 The court recalled the FCC’s 
still-binding 2002 Cable Modem Order, where ‘the Commission [had] ruled that 
cable Internet service is neither a “telecommunications service” covered by Title II of 
the Communications Act nor a “cable service” covered by Title VI’.84 In response to 
the court ruling, the FCC adopted the so-called Open Internet Order on 21 December 
2010.85 The Commission reasoned that the newly adopted protections ‘are grounded 
                                                        
76  Wu (n 3) 171. 
77  Ibid, 168. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Around the same time, network neutrality was also an issue in the 2005 Madison River Case. In that case, 
the FCC Bureau initiated an inquiry about ‘allegations that Madison River was blocking ports used for 
VoIP applications, thereby affecting customers’ ability to use VoIP through one or more VoIP service 
providers’. The case was ultimately settled out of court. In the consent decree that was referenced in an 
FCC order, Madison River agreed not to ‘block ports used for VoIP applications or otherwise prevent 
customers from using VoIP applications’. Although ‘network neutrality’ was at issue, the name of the 
concept was not mentioned. See Federal Communications Commission, Madison River Communications, 
LLC and affiliated companies, Order, File No EB-05-IH-0110, DA 05-543, adopted 3 March 2005. 
80  A preliminary step leading to the 2005 Internet Policy Statement was a February 2004 speech of FCC’s 
Chairman Powell discussing a set of network principles. See Michael Powell, ‘Preserving Internet Freedom: 
Guiding Principles for the Industry’, online: 
<https://transition.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/powell/speeches.html>. 
81  Federal Communications Commission, Broadband Access to the Internet, Policy Statement, GN Docket No 
00–185, CS Docket No 02–52, FCC 05-151, adopted 5 August 2005, p 3. 
82  Federal Communications Commission, ‘Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and 
Order’, File No EB-08-IH-1518, WC Docket No 07–52, FCC 08-183, adopted 1 August 2008. See also Hart 
(n 2) 433–4. 
83  Comcast v FCC (n 4) 3. 
84  Ibid, 5. 
85  Federal Communications Commission (n 5).  
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in broadly accepted Internet norms’.86 Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not share 
this view since on 14 January 2014 it struck down the FCC order in Verizon v FCC, 
again due to its insufficient legal foundation.87 More precisely, the court brushed off 
the FCC’s authority to enforce rules on network neutrality on the grounds that ISPs 
are not identified as common carriers.88 The same day, Timothy Wu commented on 
the verdict in a newspaper interview, criticising the FCC for opting for the wrong 
strategy when ‘arguing that its rules are not common carrier rules’ in the sense of 
Title II of the US Communications Act.89 Wu recommended that the FCC should now 
‘reclassify broadband under Title II authority’. He agreed with the interviewer’s 
remark that such a radical decision would be likely to cause a lot of political 
resistance, but insisted that it was now time ‘to get people in Congress excited about 
that’.90  
The job of getting ‘people in Congress excited’ about net neutrality has since been 
taken seriously by a number of Internet advocacy and public interest groups 
engaging in a unique lobbying campaign for the cause of a free and open Internet 
infrastructure. Notably, the FCC now also understood the importance of civil society 
feedback and invited people to comment on its new proposal for open Internet rules, 
published as ‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking’ on 15 May 2014.91 One of the most 
active participants in this process was Public Knowledge, a Washington DC based 
public interest group. Public Knowledge filed detailed comments with the FCC on 15 
July 2014, the first day of the consultation procedure, primarily criticising the FCC’s 
                                                        
86  Federal Communications Commission, Preserving the Open Internet, Federal Register, Vol 76, No 185, 23 
September 2011, 59192–59235. ‘The Commission adopts three basic protections that are grounded in 
broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions. First, transparency: fixed and mobile 
broadband providers must disclose the network management practices, performance characteristics, and 
commercial terms of their broadband services. Second, no blocking: fixed broadband providers may not 
block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not 
block lawful Web sites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services. 
Third, no unreasonable discrimination: fixed broadband providers may not unreasonably discriminate in 
transmitting lawful network traffic’. (59192).  
87 Verizon v FCC (n 7). 
88  Robertson (n 8). Considering ISPs as ‘common carriers’ would have required defining broadband services 
as ‘telecommunication services’ (covered by Title II of the Telecommunications Act) rather than 
‘information services’ (covered by Title I of the Telecommunications Act). In a number of decisions 
between 2001 and 2005 the FCC had classified broadband services as ‘information services’. These 
decisions were upheld by the US Supreme Court in NCTA v Brand X, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) as permissible 
though not required. See Robert Faris et al ‘Score Another One for the Internet?: The Role of the Networked 
Public Sphere in the U.S. Net Neutrality Policy Debate’, Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
University, February 2015, 11–12, online: 
<https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/2015_02_10_Score_Another_One_for_the_
Internet_0.pdf>.  
89  Brian Fung, ‘“A FEMA-level fail”: The law professor who coined “net neutrality” lashes out at the FCC’s 
legal strategy’, The Washington Post (14 January 2014), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2014/01/14/a-fema-level-fail-the-law-professor-who-coined-net-neutrality-lashes-out-at-the-fccs-
legal-strategy/>. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Federal Communications Commission, Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, GN Docket No 14–28, FCC 14-61, adopted 15 May 2014. On p 64 the rules for filing comments 
were detailed, and two deadlines of 15 July and 10 September 2014 were set for filing comments and 
replying to comments, respectively. 
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distinction between fast lanes and slow lanes online.92 Public Knowledge, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), BattlefortheNet and other influential Internet advocates93 
mobilised hundreds of thousands of supporters to directly send comments to the 
FCC expressing how they would view a truly open Internet architecture. Their 
mobilisation campaign was so successful that the FCC’s website broke down due to a 
massive surge in traffic94 and the Commission was forced to extend the timeframe for 
filing comments.95  
The more than 2 million comments made through the FCC’s Electronic Comment 
Filing System can be publicly accessed online.96 Altogether, the FCC received more 
than 3.7 million comments at this initial stage.97 A detailed analysis of the filed 
comments was undertaken by the ‘Sunlight Foundation’, a Washington-based NGO 
advocating for open government. The analysis of the first round of comments 
(800,000 comments analysed) revealed, inter alia, that less than one per cent of the 
commenters rejected the principle of net neutrality, two thirds rejected the idea of 
fast lanes, and two thirds called on the FCC to reclassify ISPs as ‘common carriers’.98 
The second round of comments was also analysed, revealing that 60 per cent of the 
analysed 1.6 million comments rejected net neutrality. The analysts explained this 
surprising result with the fact that most of the negative comments resulted from a 
campaign that was organised by ‘American Commitment’, a right-wing non-profit 
organisation. 99  This organisation provided anti-net neutrality response-letter 
templates and successfully convinced its constituency to send them to the FCC.100 Of 
                                                        
92  Public Knowledge, Official Comments for FCC Net Neutrality Proceeding, 15 July 2014, online: 
<www.publicknowledge.org/documents/official-comments-for-fcc-net-neutrality-proceeding>. 
93  John Oliver, host of the widely popular HBO weekly comedy news programme Last Week Tonight 
dedicated the show of 1 June 2014 to the topic of net neutrality. He heavily criticised the FCC’s plan to 
allow fast lanes and implored his fans to send their comments to the FCC to save the free and open 
Internet. See <www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU>. Oliver’s show had a huge mobilising effect, as 
an analysis by the Berkman Klein Center confirms. See Faris et al (n 88) 17–18.  
94  Alex Wilhelm, ‘After Users Swamp its Website, the FCC Extends the Net Neutrality Comment Period to 
Friday’, Techcrunch (15 July 2014), online: <http://techcrunch.com/2014/07/15/after-users-swamp-its-
website-the-fcc-extends-the-net-neutrality-comment-period-to-friday/>. 
95  Federal Communications Commission, ‘Wireline Competition Bureau Extends Deadline for Filing Reply 
Comments in the Open Internet and Framework for Broadband Internet Service Proceedings’, GN Docket 
Nos 14–28, 10–127, Public Notice, DA 14-1199.  
96   FCC Electronic Comment Filing System, see 
<http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment_search_solr/doSearch?proceeding=14-28>. 
97   Alex Wilhelm, ‘The FCC Received 3.7 Million Net Neutrality Comments’, Techcrunch (16 September 2014), 
online: <http://techcrunch.com/2014/09/16/the-fcc-received-3-7-million-net-neutrality-comments/>. (The 
figure was later officially adjusted to ‘nearly 4 million’, see Federal Communications Commission (n 1)). 
98  Bob Lannon and Andrew Pendleton, ‘What can we learn from 800,000 public comments on the FCC's net 
neutrality plan?’ Sunlight Foundation (2 September 2014), online: 
<http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/09/02/what-can-we-learn-from-800000-public-comments-on-the-
fccs-net-neutrality-plan/>. 
99  Andrew Pendleton and Bob Lannon, ‘One group dominates the second round of net neutrality comments’, 
Sunlight Foundation (16 December 2014), online: <http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2014/12/16/one-
group-dominates-the-second-round-of-net-neutrality-comments/>. 
100  According to the Sunlight Foundation, ‘Comments from this campaign had a shared template, with 
different targeted messages inserted between the second and third paragraph. Those targeted messages 
centered on topics as far ranging as personal freedoms, economic threats, the poor state of US public 
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the commenters that did not use the letter template from ‘American Commitment’, 
only one per cent rejected network neutrality.101 When the FCC passed the strong net 
neutrality rules on 26 February 2015, Internet advocacy groups such as Public 
Knowledge102 and EFF103 saw this as a victory for online democracy, a victory for the 
millions who had commented with the FCC, called Congress, and written to the 
White House. This view was confirmed by the FCC’s press release, mentioning that it 
was ‘the nearly 4 million commenters who participated in the FCC’s Open Internet 
proceeding’ who convinced the FCC to adopt new rules on net neutrality that ‘are 
guided by three principles: America’s broadband networks must be fast, fair and 
open’.104   
The FCC Report and Order of 26 February 2015 relies on authority derived from 
the FCC’s reclassification of broadband Internet access as a common carrier service 
under Title II of the US Communications Act. The reclassification together with 
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides the legal foundation of 
the new rules. Hence, the FCC positively responded to the many comments that had 
recommended reclassifying broadband Internet service suppliers as ‘common 
carriers’.  
Reading the 2015 FCC Order, it is striking to see that throughout most of the 
report’s 400 pages the FCC continually refers to opinions and views received from 
the commenters. Notably, at para 114 of the Order, the FCC mentions that it had 
abandoned the originally proposed idea of fast lanes, due to arguments put forward 
in many of the received comments. 105  The Commission’s explicit references to 
comments received demonstrates that the FCC developed and legally formalised its 
position on open Internet rules based not on expert views but on a public discourse 
that encompassed a variety of voices, including those of broadband providers, public 
interest groups and other civil society stakeholders. 
The FCC’s decision triggered a new attack by the cable, telecom and wireless 
Internet providers in the legal battle over net neutrality. This time, however, the 
Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit upheld the FCC rules in a two-to-one decision of 
                                                                                                                                                       
utilities, and the characterization of pro-NN advocates as extreme leftists’. The campaign led by American 
Commitment was single-handedly responsible for 56.5 per cent of the comments in this round. See 
Pendleton and Lannon (n 99). 
101  Pendleton and Lannon (n 99). 
102  Michael Weinberg, ‘Landmark Day for Net Neutrality’, Public Knowledge (15 September 2014), online: 
<www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/a-landmark-day-for-net-neutrality>. 
103  Jeremy Gillula and Mitch Stoltz, ‘Dear FCC: Thanks for Listening to Team Internet!’, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (26 February 2015), online: <www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/02/fcc-votes-net-neutrality-big-win>. 
104  See Federal Communications Commission, ‘FCC adopts Strong, Sustainable Rules to Protect the Open 
Internet’, FCC Press Release (26 February 2016), 1, online: 
<http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0226/DOC-332260A1.pdf>. 
105  Federal Communications Commission (n 1): ‘After consideration of the record, we reject the minimum 
level of access standard. Broadband providers, edge providers, public interest organizations, and other 
parties note the practical and technical difficulties associated with setting any such minimum level of 
access. For example, some parties note the uncertainty created by an indefinite standard. Other parties 
observe that in creating any such standard of service for no-blocking, the Commission risks jeopardizing 
innovation. We agree with these arguments and many others in the record expressing concern with the 
proposed minimum level of access standard’. (para 114). 
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14 June 2016. 106  The Court rejected the petitioner’s numerous challenges to the 
Commission’s reclassification of the broadband service as a telecommunications 
service. Thus, the Court ruled that the FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order had a legal 
foundation and that the promulgated net neutrality rules are valid. Although the 
Court of Appeal’s decision was groundbreaking, the juridification of net neutrality 
remains contingent as the losing parties immediately announced they would bring 
the case before the US Supreme Court.107 
4.2 THEORETICAL CLASSIFICATION 
The empirical evidence from the US shows that net neutrality is a young and 
nascent concept. As a rather vague idea originally aired in academic circles, it was 
taken up by civil society exponents once the contours of an (initially) latent conflict 
between private and public interests in the design of the Internet architecture became 
more clearly visible. An early incident triggering the concern of Internet advocates 
was the Madison River Case in 2005.108 In this case Madison River, a telephone 
company, blocked Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) applications of Vonage, one of 
its access customers, in order to exclusively control Internet telephony services.109 
This case was settled out of court and the word ‘neutrality’, although clearly at issue, 
was not mentioned in the Consent Decree that was referenced in the FCC Order of 3 
March 2005.110 The Madison River case got Public Knowledge to publish a White 
Paper in 2006, also reporting on a number of other cases where ISPs had been 
blocking or discriminating Internet traffic. 111  The White Paper explicitly warned 
against the risks for the open Internet architecture caused by ISPs increasingly 
introducing distinctions between fast and slow lanes online in order to extract higher 
profits from price differentiation. Public Knowledge, in conclusion, announced it 
would join other civil society initiatives in their efforts to call upon ‘Congress to enact, 
or the FCC to adopt, an enforceable “Net Neutrality” rule to ensure the Internet 
remains open and accessible to all’.112 The wording of this announcement showed 
that the project was still broadly formulated at this stage and that a clear view of the 
declared target and a detailed strategy of how to get there were still missing. In the 
Comcast case, then, the company’s discrimination between types of content as a 
technological weapon against copyright piracy stirred up a hornets’ nest. Due to the 
huge popularity of file sharing among the youth, this provoked an enormous outcry 
                                                        
106  United States Telecom Association v FCC (14 June 2016) USCA 15-1063 (DC Circuit).  
107  See Cecilia Kang, ‘Court Backs Rules Treating Internet as Utility, Not Luxury’, New York Times (14 June 
2016), online: <www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/technology/net-neutrality-fcc-appeals-court-
ruling.html?_r=0>. 
108  For the reference, see n 79. 
109  Hart (n 2) 422; Simon Schlauri, Network Neutrality: Netzneutralität als neues Regulierungsprinzip des 
Telekommunikationsrechts (Nomos, 2010) 156–7. 
110  See Federal Communications Commission (n 79). 
111  John Windhausen Jr, ‘Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open Internet through Net 
Neutrality’, Public Knowledge White Paper (6 February 2006) 16-23, online: 
<www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep-20060206.pdf>.  
112  Ibid, 2. 
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and helped net neutrality rapidly gain prominence within larger segments of 
society.113 The FCC’s 2008 order prohibiting Comcast from throttling P2P content and 
requiring it to respect ‘net neutrality’ was the Commission’s first Internet 
management decision, implementing the open Internet principles set forth in its 2005 
Statement of Internet Policy in a pilot case.114 The wrangling between the FCC and 
telecom lobbies that followed in the years after the Comcast decision helped issues of 
net neutrality to climb up the agenda of national politics. The 2015 decision of the 
FCC can be seen as a further milestone in the process of the institutionalisation of net 
neutrality as a social value. This is a quite extraordinary story. Within a short space 
of time, net neutrality gradually evolved from being an idealistic ‘dream’ exclusively 
discussed in highly specialised academic circles, to becoming a ‘battle cry’ capable of 
mobilising millions of people for collective action. In a recent analysis, the Berkman 
Klein Center compared the net neutrality debate with the battle against the Stop 
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA) in 2011–
2012, which was a prior example of massive social mobilisation over the Internet. 
Whereas the SOPA/PIPA debate was merely defensive, as its purpose was to prevent 
stricter legislation on copyright enforcement, the debate about net neutrality ‘is the 
first major example of a successful campaign to achieve an affirmative rule change in 
the teeth of well-organized lobbying opposition’.115  
The Berkman Klein Center analysed the last 12 months before the 2015 decision 
of the FCC, focusing on the impact of the networked public sphere on collective 
action. It found that the strongly approving networked public sphere mobilised 
millions of people to send comments and emails to the regulatory and political 
authorities. Eventually, this persuaded the FCC to alter its stance regarding the 
classification of broadband services and to do what was necessary to effectively 
protect net neutrality.116 Strikingly, the dynamics leading to the institutionalisation of 
net neutrality did not originate from the brains of a few political leaders but sprang 
up from the bottom levels of society.117 According to the Berkman Klein Center, the 
mainstream media as well as Internet-based social networking services were used by 
a variety of proponents of net neutrality as vehicles for social mobilisation.118 The fact 
that it was possible to mobilise such a large number of Internet users within a short 
period of time is extraordinary. Certainly, the means of information technology in 
                                                        
113  Comcast was accused of having secretly throttled data from customers using Bittorrent, a file-sharing 
software. See Sonia Katyal, ‘Filtering, Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience’ (2009) 32(4) Columbia Journal of 
Law and the Arts 401, 417–18. 
114  Federal Communications Commission (n 81). 
115  Faris et al (n 88). For a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the mobilisation in the SOPA-PIPA 
campaign see Yochai Benkler et al ‘Social Mobilisation and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the 
SOPA-PIPA Debate’ (Berkman Klein Center Research Publication No 2013-16 (2013)) online: 
<www.ssrn.com/abstract=2295953>. 
116  The Berkman Klein Center’s study confirms that the dynamics of the networked public sphere were 
instrumental in turning around the FCC’s policy on net neutrality and scoring ‘one of the more unlikely 
political victories Americans have seen in a long time’. Faris et al (n 88) 21.  
117  The fact that President Obama spoke out in favour of strong net neutrality rules on 10 November 2014 
does not contradict this analysis. See Faris et al (n 88) 22. Although Obama’s intervention was important 
for the FCC, it came rather late in the process, at a time when the networked public sphere was already 
strongly favouring net neutrality. 
118  Faris et al (n 88) 23. 
22                                                                                                     BOTTOM-UP CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CASE OF NET NEUTRALITY 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
general and social networks in particular have facilitated active participation of 
citizens. 119  At the same time they have also manifested dangers as with the 
dissemination of response-letter templates through ‘American Commitment’.120 On 
balance, the fact that millions of people not only stood up for an open and neutral 
Internet but also took the trouble to write letters and emails and to send comments to 
the regulator and political authorities is evidence of a robust institutionalisation of 
net neutrality as a high-ranking social value in the United States.121 
In the sense of Gunther Teubner’s theorising, we are in the midst of a process of 
societal constitutionalism. Teubner understands the development of civil 
constitutions as a process over three steps, starting with the emergence of normative 
expectations from a specific sub-system in a reflexive process, followed by 
juridification, and in the third step, a second reflexive process where constitutional 
structures emerge.122 
With regard to the first step, it first needs to be clarified what the specific sub-
system would be in the case of constitutionalism in cyberspace. Teubner’s answer 
would probably be the Internet, as he considers the Internet to be an autonomous 
social system.123 I would not find such a solution to be theoretically and empirically 
compelling. The Internet is quite different from all the well-known social systems 
that have been analysed in the seminal literature of sociological systems theory. 
Luhmann distinguishes four general types of systems including psychic systems, 
social systems, organisms and machines.124 The particularity of social and psychic 
systems is meaning125—these systems are in the business of producing meaning. 
Thus, meaning allows one to differentiate between psychic and social systems on the 
one hand and organisms and machines on the other hand. However, meaning does 
                                                        
119  Ibid, 32. 
120  In a 2007 exploratory survey of 1,556 citizen participants in regulatory public comment processes in the US, 
Schlosberg et al found considerable differences between commenters who submit original comments and 
commenters who submit a form comment. The latter group appeared to be generally less educated, less 
informed about politics and more negative about the government. David Schlosberg et al, ‘Democracy and 
E-Rulemaking: Web-Based Technologies, Participation, and the Potential for Deliberation’ (2007) 4(1) 
Journal of Information Technology & Politics 37, 48–9. A recent representative study sheds critical light on the 
reliability of public consultations on net neutrality with self-selected respondents. See René CG Arnold et al, 
‘All But Neutral: Citizen Responses to the European Commission’s Public Consultation on Network 
Neutrality’ in Luca Belli and Primavera de Filippi (eds), Net Neutrality Compendium, Human Rights, Free 
Competition and the Future of the Internet (Springer International Publishing, 2016) 199. Two findings of the 
study are noteworthy. First, the study found indications ‘of a strong underlying self-selection bias’ in 
public consultations on net neutrality (p 205). Second, the study revealed that it is difficult for consumers 
to understand the terminology and the concept of net neutrality without further explanations (p 203). 
Hence, one may conclude from this study that any survey on net neutrality is susceptible to influence from 
or manipulation by its designer.  
121  This conclusion is not invalidated by the fact that overall only a minority of the US population have ever 
heard of net neutrality or know what the concept stands for. See Center for Political Communication, 
‘National Survey on Net Neutrality’, University of Delaware (10 November 2014), online: 
<www.udel.edu/cpc/research/fall2014/UD-CPC-NatAgenda2014PR_2014NetNeutrality.pdf>. 
122  Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 33). 
123  Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism’ (n 33) 21. 
124  Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, translated by John Bednarz with Dirk Baecker (Stanford University Press, 
1995) 2. 
125  Ibid, 59–102. 
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not allow one to distinguish between social systems and psychic systems. Luhmann 
therefore needed elements that were particular to social systems. He did not choose 
actions of human beings as other social theorists (eg Jürgen Habermas) have. 
Luhmann chose communications as the basic elements of social systems.126 Hence, 
social systems are communicative systems. With their communications social 
systems produce meaning, as is the case with the law, politics, the economy, science, 
mass media, art, religion, education, family and love—the most prominent social 
systems that have been analysed by Luhmann. By contrast, the Internet is more a 
machine than a communicative system. It belongs to the material world since it 
consists of a network of interconnected computers. As a network, the Internet is 
morphologically hybrid. Although the Internet does not directly produce meaning, 
by the networking of computers it materially designs the linking up of 
communicative events.127  
According to Luhmann, communications are produced by social systems as 
events, which occupy a minimal time span before they disappear. Luhmann 
emphasises that 
 
[a]ll structures of social systems have to be based on this fundamental fact of 
vanishing events, disappearing gestures or words that are dying away. Memory, and 
then writing, have their function in preserving not the events, but their structure-
generating power.128 
 
Similarly, the Internet’s function is to preserve the structure-generating power of 
communicative events. It does so by networking an unlimited number of computers 
which are used as the technical means for communication. Therefore, the Internet 
cannot itself be an event. An event produced by one system may also irritate the 
autopoiesis of a second system that is observing the first system. By these means a 
structural coupling of social systems is established. 129  A structural coupling is 
defined by Luhmann as a co-evolution of two systems that is triggered by a certain 
communicative event which is in the environment of both systems.130 Systems may 
observe a communicative event in their environment as an irritant, and such 
irritation may trigger structural adaptations within the system, according to the 
evolutionary processes of variation, selection and stabilisation. If such an event is of 
longer duration it becomes an episode. A constitution of a nation state is an example 
of an episode coupling the legal system and the political system. Hence, there is a 
trans-discursive relationship between the material elements of the network 
(computers, algorithms, electronic signals, wires etc) and the discursive sphere of the 
(structurally coupled) social systems, which, for their part, are structurally coupled 
through communicative events. In the case of net neutrality, such events may trigger 
                                                        
126  Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’ in RF Geyer and J van der Zouwen (eds), 
Sociocybernetic Paradoxes: Observation, Control, and Evolution of Self-Steering Systems (Sage Publications, 1986) 
172–92, 174–6. 
127  For a similar view see Dan Wielsch, Zugangsregeln (Mohr Siebeck, 2008) 236–8. 
128  Luhmann (n 126) 180. 
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a structural coupling between various function systems, including between the 
economic system and the law or between the economic system and the political 
system, for example. Which structural coupling can be observed is a question of the 
observer’s perspective.  
If not the Internet, what else? Of all the systems involved in the communication 
about net neutrality, I consider the economic system to be the one of greatest 
relevance for the emergence of normative expectations. The debate about net 
neutrality is very much about money, as demonstrated, for example, by the dispute 
over the creation of fast lanes.131 It is in the economic system where we witness the 
emergence of normative expectations that are related to preserving an open and 
neutral Internet. 
We can describe this as reflexive interaction between the organised professional 
sphere and the spontaneous sphere of the system, a distinction suggested by 
Teubner’s theory of societal constitutionalism. 132  In the organised sphere of the 
Internet economy we find the major cable and telephone companies, including 
Madison River, Comcast, Verizon, AT&T and others. As mentioned, these companies 
have been among the main protagonists in the leading court cases on net neutrality 
where they have defended their economic interests, and more particularly their 
ability to conduct network management practices. It is therefore no surprise that the 
major US telecom firms also filed a Petition for Review against the FCC’s Title II 
Order of February 2015.133 The main interest of the telecom lobby was to prevent a 
limitation of their economic power that would be caused by enforceable rights of net 
neutrality.134 In the spontaneous sphere of the system we find the Internet advocacy 
groups, civil rights movements, consumer organisations, public interest groups etc 
that have been active in social media networks and other fora taking part in the 
debates about strengthening the values of communicative freedom and open Internet. 
These interventions have chiefly been aimed at introducing limitative elements into 
the constitution of the Internet economy. The process is reflexive because in the 
competing relationship between the spontaneous and the formally organised spheres, 
net neutrality matured from being a vague idea to eventually becoming a concept 
with more precise normative contours. The interplay between the two spheres has 
proved to be difficult since the organised sphere generally does not receive direct 
input from the spontaneous sphere. Indirect influences would be possible, for 
example, through consumers of telecommunication or Internet access services 
                                                        
131  The creation of fast lanes would have allowed ISPs to offer higher-speed services for content providers 
willing to pay extra for privileged Internet access. Critics argued that this ‘would raise prices for customers 
of streaming video services’ and disadvantage start-ups and not-for-profit Internet organisations who 
would not have the financial means to pay higher prices. See Center for Political Communication, 
‘National Survey on Net Neutrality’, University of Delaware (10 November 2014), online: 
<www.udel.edu/cpc/research/fall2014/UD-CPC-NatAgenda2014PR_2014NetNeutrality.pdf>. See also 
Inimai M Chettiar and J Scott Holladay, ‘Free to Invest: The Economic Benefits of Preserving Net 
Neutrality’, Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law (January 2010) 39–47, online: 
<http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Free_to_Invest.pdf>.  
132  Teubner, Constitutional Fragments, (n 33) 88–102. 
133  See Michael Powell, ‘Why we are appealing the FCC’s title II decision’, National Cable & Telecommunications 
Association (NCTA) (14 April 2015), online: <www.ncta.com/platform/public-policy/why-we-are-appealing-
the-fccs-title-ii-decision>.  
134  Hart (n 2) 425–7. 
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making their consumption decisions conditional on telecom companies voluntarily 
refraining from discriminating certain traffic on their networks. 
In a second step, according to Teubner, constitutionalisation would require a 
juridification of the self-founded normative expectations. 135  In the language of 
systems theory this should be understood as a structural coupling between the 
economic system and the legal system. As a direct flow of information from one 
system to the other is not possible, structural coupling is the only possibility for a 
resonance between systems. Accordingly, the above identified reflexive mechanisms 
of the economic system are coupled with the reflexive mechanisms of the law, which 
consist of ‘secondary legal norm creation in which norms are applied to norms’.136 
The structural coupling led to the FCC’s Title II Order of February 2015. In a 
communication process primarily with the Court of Appeals of the DC Circuit, the 
telecom lobby and civil society, the FCC was able to sharpen the normative contours 
of net neutrality and eventually adopt rules that were clear, rigorous and enforceable. 
Certainly, the juridification process has not yet come to an end as the losing telecom 
companies announced they would be bringing the matter before the US Supreme 
Court, after the Court of Appeals’ decision of 14 June 2016.137 Moreover, it remains 
completely open whether net neutrality will survive the presidency of Donald 
Trump. Although Trump’s position in this regard is still hard to predict at press time, 
several members of his FCC transition team have explicitly criticised net neutrality.138  
To conclude, the social institutionalisation of net neutrality as a constitutional 
right appears to have reached an advanced level already. The concept’s legal 
institutionalisation, however, is still in progress. That is not all. Before we would be 
able to speak of an institutionalisation of net neutrality as a fundamental right of the 
US Constitution, a second reflexive process within the legal system would need to 
take place. This third step in Teubner’s theory is about the development of 
constitutional structures. At this stage, the normative expectations juridified in the 
above-mentioned structural coupling would be reviewed in a second reflexive 
process within the legal system. Such second order observation would likely take 
place before a higher court that would subject legal rules to a test regarding the 
question of whether these norms complied with the established norms of the 
constitution. Here, one needs to distinguish two steps: a first step where a 
constitutional court would decide that rules on net neutrality were in conformity 
with the constitution, and a second step where the court would declare net neutrality 
to be a constitutional right. Only the second step would produce the constitutional 
quality of net neutrality, operating a constitutional/unconstitutional binary code. 
Teubner emphasises that this constitutional code emerges from the social sphere 
concerned (the economy in the case at issue) via juridification/structural coupling 
with the legal system. 139  In the case of the United States, such constitutional 
structures would emerge either through case-based incremental developments in the 
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136  Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (n 33) 105. 
137  Kang (n 107) and accompanying text. 
138  See Russell Brandom, ‘Will Net Neutrality Survive Donald Trump?’, The Verge (30 November 2016), online: 
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practice of the US Supreme Court, moving towards an eventual recognition of a 
fully-fledged freedom or, what is less likely, through a constitutional amendment 
requiring supermajority consensus of either Congress alone or jointly with the 
several states, depending on the mode of proposal or ratification.140 In any event, 
such a process would take a long time. 
5. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL AND FORMAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES  
The debate about net neutrality in the United States is a showcase for the 
spontaneous emergence of constitutional norms from the bottom of society. In the 
realm of the Internet it provides evidence validating the theoretical thesis 
underpinning this paper that constitutional norms commonly emerge from society as 
social values before they are juridified as constitutional rights and become part of the 
law. The question that remains to be addressed is how the process of societal 
constitutionalism relates to democratically legitimised formal procedures of 
constitution-making. How should this dualism between formally organised 
rationality and informal spontaneity be qualified from a democracy perspective? 
Obviously, the spontaneous processes of constitutionalisation do not meet the 
formal requirements of constitutional change as they have not been enacted by 
democratically legitimised institutions according to formally prescribed procedures. 
However, while social constitutions lack democratic legitimacy, they may still be 
accepted by smaller or larger segments of society. As Max Weber has forcefully 
argued, there may indeed be acceptance without democratic legitimation.141 Weber’s 
presumption is that legal subjects generally obey commands that are accepted.142 
While democratic procedures further the acceptance of a norm, acceptance and 
democratic legitimation must still be distinguished.143 Theoretically, situations may 
exist where the processes producing democratic legitimation are defective or do not 
sufficiently include certain values, having not yet received clear normative contours. 
In the yet scarcely mapped digital networked environment it may indeed be that a 
social value such as net neutrality—although of crucial importance to the public 
interest—is not sufficiently represented in legislative processes that are often 
dominated by powerful lobbies pushing for particular corporate interests.144 A prime 
example of this is the net neutrality debate in the European Union (EU) which, in its 
initial stages, was criticised for inadequately reflecting the public interest.145 Indeed, 
                                                        
140  Tribe (n 43) 95. 
141  Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1, translated by Günther Roth, 
(University of California Press, 1978) 212–16. 
142  David Trubek, ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ (1972) 3 Wisconsin Law Review 720, 732. 
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University Press, 2014) 155. 
144  For a rich collection of examples where big Internet corporations have preferred to enhance their 
businesses rather than being socially responsible or furthering the public good, see Rebecca MacKinnon, 
Consent of the Networked: The World-Wide Struggle for Internet Freedom (Basic Books, 2012) 115–65. 
145  In the tripartite debate on net neutrality in the EU, the contributions of the Commission and the Council 
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the EU law to safeguard open Internet access, which was adopted on 25 November 
2015 (commonly referred to as the Telecoms Single Market Regulation), draws up a 
loose interpretative framework of net neutrality that does not exclude fast lanes or 
zero rating146 and provides a loophole definition of allowable traffic management 
interference.147 Commenters have criticised the new rules for being the result of a 
debate dominated by a ‘corporate interests come first’ type of reasoning.148 In a 
detailed analysis, Jan Gerlach compares the net neutrality debates in the US and EU 
and identifies a number of differences relating to, inter alia, difficulties in framing net 
neutrality in an intelligible way, the organisation of the telecom authorities, 
regulatory structures and civil society participation.149 In our context, the disparities 
relating to the last-mentioned issue are of the greatest interest. Regarding civil 
society involvement in the US, it is important to recall that the FCC not only invited 
people to comment on its 2014 ‘Notice of Proposed Rulemaking’ but also listened to 
them. Ultimately, it even abandoned its originally proposed idea of fast lanes in 
response to the received comments. 150  The European Commission, by contrast, 
considered the consultation process merely as a fact-finding exercise.151 Moreover, a 
lack of transparency during stages of the negotiations made it difficult for the general 
public to follow the debate.152 Overall, there was very limited participation of civil 
society in the so-called trialogue between the Commission, Council and Parliament 
up to the adoption of the Telecoms Single Market Regulation in Autumn 2015.  
Rather surprisingly, however, the situation changed when it was the turn of the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) to draft 
guidelines for the implementation of the net neutrality rules in the adopted 
Regulation at member state level. Apparently, BEREC was inspired by the net 
neutrality debate in the US as experts from civil society were included in the process 
of creating the guidelines and publishing draft guidelines for public consultation on 
                                                                                                                                                       
ignoring several earlier resolutions of the Parliament in favour of strict rules on net neutrality. See Joe 
McNamee and Maryant Fernández, ‘Net Neutrality: An Analysis of the European Union’s Trialogue 
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Corynne McSherry and Kit Walsh, ‘Zero Rating: What It Is and Why You Should Care’, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (18 February 2016), online: <www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-
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Wired (27 October 2015), online: www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2015-10/27/net-neutrality-european-
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and the E.U. (Dike, 2016) 240–64. 
150  See n 105 and accompanying text. 
151  Gerlach (n 149) 178, 249–50. 
152  See Thomas Lohninger, ‘How we saved the Internet’, Save the Internet (4 October 2016), online: 
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the implementation of new net neutrality rules.153 BEREC received almost half a 
million responses, which is a historic high considering that they had never received 
more than one hundred (!) responses in their previous consultations.154 A crucial 
player in this process was Save the Internet, a broad coalition of civil society 
exponents and Internet activists, which created a web page providing legal analysis 
of the various official documents and assisted citizens with their participation in the 
public consultation. 155  In spite of Europe’s fragmented linguistic landscape and 
through a colourful campaign, they managed to attract considerable media attention, 
motivate thousands of websites to protest 156  and mobilise a sizeable number of 
citizens to directly communicate with the telecom regulators. BEREC explained that 
the received comments provided the regulators with valuable feedback from 
stakeholders and increased transparency.157 It is remarkable that the final guidelines 
provide clarification on some of the critical provisions that had only been vaguely 
defined in the Regulation. Accordingly, Internet providers are barred from 
commercial blocking or throttling of services aside from reasonably managing their 
networks, such as to avoid congestion. Zero rating is to be permitted only within 
narrow limits. With respect to specialised services (ie services that are optimised for 
specific content, applications or services), the final guidelines specify that these can 
only be used for services that have nothing to do with Internet access, and cannot be 
misused to sell preferential treatment of regular Internet services.158 
The chronicle of the net neutrality debate in the EU shows how activist-driven 
mobilisation of wide segments of civil society can enhance a public debate on 
emerging societal values. However, I would hasten to add that spontaneous 
processes of constitutionalisation cannot replace democratically legitimised 
legislation or constitutional amendment. Rather, the formal and the social 
constitution should be seen as interconnected vessels. The formal constitution will be 
the benchmark for evaluating the democratic quality of bottom-up constitutional 
processes. Hence, there is a reflexive relationship between the two types of 
constitution. The formal national constitution will continue to be the ultimate point 
of reference for the channelling of issues related to the distinction and interrelation 
between law and politics at the national level,159 while spontaneous processes of 
                                                        
153  See public consultation on the draft BEREC Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of 
European Net Neutrality rules, online: 
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societal constitutionalism develop bottom-up from local cultures. Although these 
cultures are rooted locally, their horizon is global. The Internet has made the world 
an interconnected whole and ultimately fulfilled McLuhan’s 1962 prophecy of the 
‘global village’, where he argues that ‘the electro-magnetic discoveries have recreated 
the simultaneous “field” in all human affairs so that the human family now exists 
under conditions of a “global village”’.160  
Concluding, cultural practices will emerge from interaction between parties with 
a local basis and a global horizon of communication.161 If net neutrality becomes the 
subject of such communication, the code of the economic system will be used and 
normative expectations regarding net neutrality will develop within the economic 
system. As described above, the norm production emerging from the spontaneous 
sphere will be competing with expectations that are being formed within the 
organised professional sphere of the economic system. This reflexive process of norm 
production will be followed by the second stage of the constitutionalisation process 
where the normative expectations emerging from the economic system will be 
juridified in a structural coupling with the legal system. Depending on the case at 
issue, concrete norms will be produced at the level of national, international or 
transnational law. In the case of the US debate, juridification of net neutrality is 
mainly being channelled through national law-based litigation procedures and will 
result in decisions of the national courts. When constitutional questions arise, the 
point of reference for the courts will be the specific national (formal) constitution.162 
In the European Union, in addition to national constitutional processes, the ECtHR 
and the CJEU will play an important role at the international or supranational level 
of constitutionalisation. Because of the leading position of the US-American Internet 
platforms, the net neutrality debate in the US has an important signalling effect on 
constitutionalisation processes in other countries and will impact the speed of the 
principle’s universalisation.163 
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[1962]) 36. Two years later he wrote in Understanding Media: ‘As electronically contracted, the globe is no 
more than a village. Electric speed in bringing all social and political functions together in a sudden 
implosion has heightened human awareness of responsibility to an intense degree’. Marshall McLuhan, 
Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (MIT Press, 1994 [1964]) 5. 
161  According to Luhmann, three types of social systems need to be distinguished: interaction, organisations 
and society. See Luhmann (n 124) 2, 15. 
162  For a media theory-based account of the relationship between sectoral societal constitutions and the 
national (formal) constitution see Thomas Vesting, Computernetzwerke, Die Medien des Rechts, vol 4, 
(Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2015) 110–25. 
163  Timothy Garton Ash, Free Speech (Yale University Press, 2016) 357-60. 
